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This practical experience report summarises the lessons learned during investigation of a case study
which focused on engineering protective wrappers as a means of detecting and tolerating errors or
undesirable behaviour in systems employing OTS components. We developed a protective wrapper
capable of dealing with typical errors caused by unavailability of signals, violations of range limitations,
and oscillations. The work was carried out in a simulation environment using a Simulink model of an
industrial steam boiler system together with an OTS PID (Proportional, Integral and Derivative)
controller. The lessons learned from the development of, and experimentation with, our case study are
categorised as: those relating specifically to the use of Simulink for system modelling; those that
concern the use of simulation more generally, as a means of analysing design options; and those that
inform the development of protective wrappers.
1. Introduction
Many siren voices, and some harsh economic facts, argue in favour of Off The Shelf (OTS) components
as a way to reduce the costs of software system development. Compared with bespoke design and
development, the OTS option offers a number of potential benefits, including: immediate availability,
proven in use, low price due to cost amortisation. The increasing scale and complexity of modern
software systems is a powerful driver for modularity in design, which clearly chimes with a component
(or sub-system) based approach.
Inevitably there is a downside. The bespoke approach offers full control of development, adherence to
appropriate standards, and the opportunity for production and retention of documentation and other
evidence in support of an evaluation that a component is fit for purpose. Utilisation of an OTS compo-
nent could mean, in extreme cases, that no information is available on the inner workings of the
component, or on its development; proven in use evidence will frequently be anecdotal and is unlikely to
relate to an identical use environment.
An appealingly simple application of diversity to this dilemma is that of wrapper technology [8, 12]. An
OTS component can be enclosed in a bespoke protective wrapper which intercepts inputs to, and outputs
from, the OTS component in order to monitor behaviour and attempt to handle any problems. Knowl-
edge of the capabilities of the wrapper may then be used in arguments for sound operation of the system.
DOTS (Diversity with OTS components)1 is a joint project at CSR in Newcastle and City Universities,
funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. We have explored the use of a
protective wrapper in a case study based on a steam boiler system. Since experimentation with a real-
world critical system would be fraught with peril, we have adapted an industrial grade simulation of a
coal-fired steam raising system. In this respect we have followed established industrial design practice in
many sectors, where design innovations are first evaluated via simulation.
2. Case study — the boiler system
Specific aspects of our boiler case study have been reported in previous papers [1, 2]. We developed a
protective wrapper for a PID (Proportional, Integral and Derivative) controller, supplied to us as an OTS
item. PID control is used in many applications, including: chemical processes, tuneable lasers, level and
flow control, temperature control and motor control. A boiler operated via a PID controller is one of the
most widely deployed systems, installed in industrial facilities and residential houses for the safe and
reliable generation of steam and/or hot water. Nevertheless, critical incidents in these systems lead to
deaths and injuries every year [11]. We took a pragmatic view in developing a defensive strategy of
exploiting specialised fault tolerance techniques, deployed in the form of a protective wrapper.
The boiler case study was intended to evaluate how our approach could be applied in practice, employ-
ing software models to simulate the PID controller and the steam boiler system rather than conducting
potentially risky experiments in a real-world environment. Use of such software models is an active area
of research and development carried out by many leading control product companies (including
Honeywell [3]), and we used a third-party model of a steam boiler system for our study. We believe that
this decision adds credibility to our results. The model simulates a real controller and steam boiler
system, enabling us to investigate the effect of wrapping with a genuinely representative model.
                                                 
1 http://www.csr.ncl.ac.uk/dots/
The structure of the system is shown in Figure 1. The overall system has two principal components: the
boiler system and the control system; the control system consists of a PID controller (the OTS item), and
the Rest Of the System (ROS — which is simply the remainder of the control system). The wrapper
component is inserted so as to intercept all communication between the PID controller and the ROS.
Fig. 1. Boiler System and Control System (including the PID Controller)
One of the built-in modelling tools in MATLAB is Simulink [6] and we used this to support our
experimental work. Variables can be monitored while the simulation is running by incorporating display
blocks into the model, and results can be stored in the MATLAB workspace for post-processing.
Working with the simulated model we were able to perform repeatable experiments by manipulating any
of the changeable variables or modifying the connections between system components. This enabled us
to generate and analyse a range of plausible error scenarios.
3. Motivation and aims
Wrapping a component is increasingly utilised as a structural solution for achieving a range of aims (eg
fault injection, interface improvement, performance enhancement, fault isolation [9, 10]), and wrappers
can perform either (or both) an adaptive or protective role. Our aim was to explore an approach to
protective wrapping at a stage of design prior to implementation when only simulation and modelling
were available, to build up experience and investigate the practicality of this approach (our principal
motivation). We are not aware of any other work evaluating wrappers during simulation of the design.
It may be thought inappropriate to evaluate fault tolerant structures by means of simulation, since that
would merely explore the effectiveness of a model of the protection mechanism against artificial error
scenarios in the context of a simulation of the system and its environment — whereas what is actually
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required is real protection against genuine faults in the operational system. Our view is that, despite
these limitations, valid insights can be gained that are properly relevant to the final implemented system.
            Fig. 2a. Simulated elements                                                     Fig. 2b. Actual system components
Figure 2b represents an implemented control system; a real ROS interacting with a real OTS component
via a real wrapper. [We have not depicted the ‘system under control’ nor the real-world environment in
which it operates.] Figure 2a shows a simulation of the control system, in which the ROS, OTS
component and wrapper are all modelled within the simulation, as indicated by the dashed lines. Would
conclusions based on experiment and analysis on the simulated framework of Figure 2a be relevant to
the eventual implementation depicted in 2b? As well as a general concern for fidelity of the simulation,
and the specific issue of  fault modelling, there is the added complication of achieving a valid simulation
of the actual OTS item, which in some circumstances may have to be regarded as a black box (ie no
knowledge of its inner workings). Our assertion, borne out by experience with the case study, is that
despite these concerns considerable benefits can still be gained. However, the approach adopted must
seek to minimise the drawbacks, while recognising that these concerns cannot be entirely eliminated.
First, the benefits. These are mainly a consequence of enabling consideration of the wrapper design at an
early stage of system development. The wrapper designer is given early exposure to the (simulated)
control system design, and is able to build up an understanding of the role and function of the OTS item,
and the way it will be used (and misused) by the ROS. Our methodology for wrapper design requires the
development engineer to examine the models of ROS and OTS (and their compatibility), to create a
‘specification’ for the ROS/OTS interaction, to analyse that specification, to formulate fault hypotheses,
to explore strategies for error detection and recovery, and to select mechanisms to be employed by the
(at this stage) simulated wrapper. This work will be of direct benefit when the wrapper to be deployed in
the real system is subsequently designed and built. Any problems uncovered in the models of the ROS
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and OTS may lead to their being upgraded, with knock-on benefits in the design of the control system
itself. And finally, there are many situations in which the simulation route is by far the safer option, in
that experimentation with a real-world system would be out of the question.
Second, minimising the drawbacks. Development by simulation must always seek to maximise the
extent to which the models used faithfully represent the anticipated real-world situation; this is true for
any design process that makes use of abstract representations. We stress this requirement throughout the
work described here: in modelling the ROS, with particular attention given to fault assumptions; in
ascertaining the behaviour of the modelled OTS item; and in identifying the need to convert the
simulated wrapper accurately to its real implementation. Finally, we recognise (of course) that investi-
gation and validation of the actual wrapper, as realised in Figure 2b, will still be necessary.
One constructive way to help bridge the gap between 2a and 2b is shown in Figure 3, where the actual
OTS component is enveloped in an implemented wrapper. The wrapped component can then be
evaluated using a test harness [9] or a full simulation of the ROS. Of course, even the simulated ROS
cannot be fully representative of its real-world counterpart, but that is simply a recognised limitation
which certainly does not undermine the value of the approach. Our approach takes a further step away
from reality, but continues to offer a valuable design route. Indeed, where the construction of Figure 3 is
available we believe that an approach based on an initial evaluation phase in Figure 2a, then moving to
the real OTS in Figure 3, before the final construction of Figure 2b, has much to commend it.
Fig. 3. Simulated ROS with actual wrapper and OTS component
4. Case study — wrapper development
In Section 3 we introduced our general approach to wrapping. We now describe how this approach was
followed in the application summarised in Section 2, outlining the steps of development of a protective
wrapper for the OTS PID controller component in the boiler system case study.
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Our first step was to identify the Acceptable Behaviour Constraints (ABCs) [1,7] to be applied to the
PID controller. We then incorporated a model of a wrapper component into the simulation of the boiler
system by means of a set of Simulink blocks which intersect each of the lines between the ROS and the
PID controller. These blocks impose the ABCs on the behaviour of the PID. The ABCs effectively
specify a contract stipulating the ‘imposed’ behaviour of the PID. A contract specifying the genuine
behaviour (if information was available to enable such a contract to be specified) would have a weaker
post-condition, due to defects existing within the PID.
To bring the behaviour of the PID controller into alignment with that stipulated by the ABCs, we
employed error detection and recovery mechanisms as follows. Drawing on the ABCs we sought to
characterise possible error behaviours and then create an abstract description of a wrapper which
(ideally) would (i) detect all deviations of the PID from the constraints imposed by the ABCs [1], and
(ii) respond to all such deviations by means of error handling mechanisms [2]. Analysis of the errors
detectable at the interface between the ROS and the PID leads to a categorisation in terms of in-
put/output data to and from the PID controller:
• absence of data: at the most basic level a signal is either present or absent, and unavailability of
expected data could constitute an error
• data outside specified range: the signal is available but has an illegal value
• data within range, but exceeds a maximum permitted value of rate of change over time
In response to a detected error condition we provided a (basic) error response capability via three
exception handlers:
• reset, and alert system operators
• wait, if necessary signal alarm, wait, if necessary initiate shutdown
• shutdown system and signal alarm
The wrapper was then designed to implement a recovery strategy which distinguished severity of error
according to signal and error category, and then invoked the appropriate handler.
5. Lessons gleaned
The previous sections have provided an overview of the experimentation performed by the DOTS
project. Our intention in this section is to provide a distillation of the insights and lessons that have
emerged from the development of this case study. Despite the necessary limitations in scope and
complexity, we believe that the modelled system was sufficiently realistic and challenging that the
lessons reported here will have much wider applicability. We classify the lessons learned as those that:
• relate specifically to the use of Simulink for system modelling
• concern the use of simulation, more generally, as a means of analysing design options
• inform the development of protective wrappers
5.1. Lessons about the use of Simulink
Engineers working with Simulink use a graphical editor to delineate blocks (representing components)
and lines linking those blocks (representing communication paths between components). The internal
behaviour of components can then be modelled by inserting code into blocks using an interpretive
language, and in this way the entire system can be built up. A wrapper component can then be repre-
sented in Simulink as a set of boxes intercepting the lines going into, and out from, the OTS box.
Simulink does not provide an imperative programming language (eg it does not support concepts of
information hiding, procedures, classes) but it does offer the engineer a mathematically oriented
environment. Many system engineers welcome the constrained capabilities and are attracted by the
interpretative mode of execution and the user-friendly graphical development environment [5]. The main
drawbacks to this approach are that it makes it difficult to investigate certain design/implementation
related issues, and it creates the opportunity for an error-prone gap to develop between the abstract
Simulink model and the real-world system that will actually be implemented (eg in C++ or Java).
Simulink models are usually quite high-level, with a highly simplified view of the underlying hardware
and software. The operating system, underlying middleware, communication software and hardware, and
I/O are, in most cases, either not represented at all or modelled as very simplistic entities. We believe
that where there is a possibility of a fault arising in some element of the real-world system, there needs
to be a representation (albeit an abstraction) of that element – and of any related fault tolerance measures
– in the Simulink model. A typical example is that in the original model the loss of a connection (ie
absence of a signal) could not be represented. We augmented the model so that such a fault could be
included, and developed a wrapper capable of detecting and handling such situations.
Another real-world characteristic which is difficult to model in Simulink is that of real-time. In our case
study we needed to deploy a time-out for detecting lost signals but were not able to do this directly. One
way to simulate this situation is by setting the signal to a predefined value and by interpreting that value
as signifying a missing output. Note that in the real implementation this should be achieved via a special
low-level procedure detecting time-outs using existing real-time features and returning a (predefined)
alerting value to the wrapper. This allows a clear separation of the wrapper (as well as the overall
system) functionality from the task of detecting missing outputs using time-out channels.
The role of the Simulink model is to represent elements of a real system, but some (or even all) of those
elements are still to be constructed. In developing the real system, and specifically the operational
version of the protective wrapper, a key objective is to avoid introducing spurious discrepancies.
Simulink can give a measure of assistance here, in that the simulation can incorporate code fragments
(eg written in Java), which can then be directly utilised in the implemented version of the system. In
effect this allows intermediate positions between Figures 2a, 3, and eventually 2b, to be investigated.
Recommendation 1: Aim to incorporate in the simulated model as rich and realistic a representation of
relevant potential faults (covering detection and response) as is feasible.
Recommendation 2: Aim to transform the simulated model into the real system via a sequence of stages
rather than by a single comprehensive rewrite. A step-by-step approach will maximise retention of
structure and help ensure a close mapping between the implemented system and its simulated model –
thereby maximising the retention of design decisions.
5.2. Lessons from the use of simulation as a design approach
In the Simulink model we were not working with the actual OTS PID controller, but with a component
intended to simulate the actual controller’s behaviour. Our natural inclination was to treat this model of
the controller as a ‘black box’ item, since that would reflect the characteristics of an OTS actual system
component. However, although we adopted this perspective initially it did not seem essential to maintain
it inflexibly, since – just as for a real OTS component – a designer will seek as much information as
possible from all sources to aid the design process, subject to cost-effectiveness constraints. Thus, we
sought to acquire sufficient information to advance the wrapper design process, and to do this we
investigated (to some extent) what we could learn from the model of the controller and from the model
of the ROS. In the simulated design realm, just as for real design of complex component based systems,
it is never possible to attain total completeness and consistency of design information. This observation
applies to different scenarios, such as OTS component and model from the same supplier (gain in
accuracy of representation but risk of common weaknesses), or developed independently (model may be
less faithful, but more issues may be exposed).
Clearly, the crucial first step in designing a protective wrapper is to build up an accurate understanding
of the interface the wrapper will intercept, in this case between the PID controller and the ROS. Rarely,
if ever, will a precise behavioural specification be available. When working on the modelling of OTS
components, information about the interface must be accumulated from a range of sources: product and
process documentation, experience in use, access to users or development engineers, experimental or
analytic investigation and so on. The information is likely to have different characteristics: high-level
abstractions or low level details, trustworthy or doubtful, modelling or reality; and in some cases will
reward further inquiry but in others a blank will be drawn. We sought a way of combining this disparity
of information in terms of constraints on the behaviour of the OTS item at its interface, and devised the
formal representation of ABCs [1,7] for this purpose. Utilising the ABCs, our approach aims to create a
simulation of a protective wrapper such that constraint violations and responses in the simulated
environment match up with their image in reality, so that a real system wrapper based on the simulated
model will provide corresponding protection.
Overall, we certainly conclude that the approach of exploring wrapper design in the simulated environ-
ment provided by Simulink has been beneficial. We were able to consider different options, to experi-
ment with them, and then devise strategies for error detection [1] and error recovery [2] and incorporate
these into a protective wrapper design that operated quite successfully. Ongoing experimentation, in
collaboration with our colleagues at City University, will seek to numerically quantify the coverage
delivered by the wrapper designed in this case study. Thus we conclude that we have vindicated the
views expressed earlier in Section 3.
A widely acknowledged tenet of software engineering practice is that the earlier in the development
process design issues can be exposed, the more effectively can these matters be dealt with; this is
particularly true in respect of design deficiencies (faults) both in terms of rectification and for the design
of defensive measures (fault tolerance). We argue that the system modelling environment affords an
early design opportunity for exploration of error detection and recovery strategies, and for investigating
alternative structural solutions.
A specific example can be given, drawn from the boiler case study. Two apparently key variables
monitor steam pressure: the drum pressure records the level in the pressure vessel; the bus pressure
records the value on the steam feed line. We ascertained that the Simulink model of the PID controller
made no use of the drum pressure, contrary to our, possibly naive, expectation. This might imply that
there was no need to monitor this value in the real system, perhaps because of localised protection sub-
systems on the pressure vessel. But this brought into focus the issue of whether a wrapper should only
have access to information that flows in or out of the wrapped component – or could make use of other
variables in the ROS. Our judgement is that there is no benefit in a purist posture; we gave the wrapper
read access to any variable that could help in achieving better error detection coverage.
We reiterate the importance of maintaining fidelity between the simulation and the real-world system to
be implemented, especially in the area of faulty behaviour. This is not as unrealistic as it may seem if
proper attention is paid at an early stage to fault modelling and fault tolerance. We regarded this as an
essential aspect of our approach to wrapper design.
Recommendation 3: Aim to acquire adequate information about the behaviour at the interface between
the component to be wrapped and the ROS, and seek to codify this information in the form of a
specification of the envisaged pattern of interaction.
Recommendation 4: Avoid rule-based inflexibility in making design choices.
Recommendation 5: Aim to maximise and maintain fidelity between the simulated wrapper and its
implementation in the operational system.
5.3. Lessons for developing protective wrappers
This subsection summarizes our experience in designing a comprehensive set of ABCs and in applying
them in the developing the protective wrappers.
Even for our case study, in which the COTS interface and the ROS functionality are not very complex,
we, as the wrapper developers, did not have the complete specification of either the OTS or the ROS.
We believe this is a typical situation, although having those specifications would have been the ideal
starting point for designing the ABCs. Instead, we analysed all information available on the OTS PID
controller (documentation and code), and examined the internal structure of the Simulink model of the
ROS and of the PID [1]. More information was obtained by analysing the interfaces, and by experimen-
tation with the model (eg modifications to set-points for bus pressure and O2 concentration) and, finally,
information was extracted from the system documentation (eg ranges of output temperature, coal
calorific value, steam load).
Specific categories of information were particularly useful for constructing ABCs, including the
following two basics:
• the ability to detect the absence of a signal (either from a sensor, or to an actuator)
• the valid ranges of input and output values to and from the OTS
An important part of our experience in building ABCs and the protective wrapper is in dealing with
errors at the simulation level. For this to be possible in the Simulink environment we needed to ascertain
the general (abstract) types of errors to be detected and handled, and be able to express them in Simulink
terms so that experimental work on error detection and recovery (including debugging and fault
injection) could be carried out. For the case study we devised three ABCs and modelled them in
Simulink. These dealt with: absence of signals (modelled by omitting links), values out of range
(modelled by changing initial parameters – ‘step signal’ – or by directly modifying input/output
parameters), and unacceptable oscillation (modelled by special parameters which permit a choice of
oscillation type). To implement a recovery strategy we started by identifying a range of possible
responses for each error category (eg variables that could be re-initialised, operator communication) and
mapped an appropriate selection of these into specific Simulink procedures.
Recommendation 6: Search out as much information as possible, extracting guidance on anticipated
behaviour from both ROS developers and OTS providers, to inform the construction of ABCs and
subsequent wrapper development.
Recommendation 7: Acquire essential specific information needed for constructing ABCs (eg sensor and
actuator signal paths, valid ranges of OTS input/output values).
Recommendation 8: Avoid having just one narrow perspective on the system; to achieve a high level of
fidelity in the wrapper it is important to work at an abstract design level, and at the Simulink level, and
at the same time to keep in mind the eventual system implementation – especially for error processing.
6. Further issues
In Section 4 we described our approach to developing an abstract description of the wrapper, by looking
at errors detectable at the interface between the ROS and the OTS item. Other researchers have used
Simulink to model and analyse failure behaviour [4] using a HAZOP-like analysis. Our approach could
incorporate a HAZOP style analysis to investigate errors that can occur at the component interfaces and
trace these back to causes either in the ROS or the OTS item. The HAZOP categories can be mapped to
our error classification: errors of omission correspond to a missing value, value errors to the situation
where a value is outside the specified range. We have not investigated errors of commission (a value
present when not expected) or of timing — though a rate of oscillation error could be classed as a timing
error. A recent survey of real incidents [11] showed over half to be caused by problems detectable by
wrapping the PID.
The decision to build a protective wrapper should not be taken lightly, since analysis of the ROS and the
OTS component, design, implementation and evaluation of the wrapper could be a costly operation.
However, a key principle is that the wrapper itself must not be overly complex, since that would work
against the dependability of the overall system.
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